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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

You CAN'T TAKE IT WITH YOU:

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION RULES
BASED ON RESIDENCY

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: Alice Doe is a blue-collar
worker in the fictional state of Utopia, performing specialized tasks
in a factory for average wages. She was born and raised in the state,
but her children have moved away to Pennsylvania to find better
jobs and to live closer to their spouses' families. One day at work, a
freak accident occurs, and Alice loses three fingers on her right
hand. She is no longer able to perform her job, but she is eligible
for workers' compensation benefits. Alice is confident she will be
able to maintain her modest lifestyle because Utopia's workers'
compensation system is known to give fair and adequate benefits.
According to Utopia's benefits schedule, Alice receives sixty
six percent of her former salary for twenty-five weeks as compensa
tion for the loss of her fingers. Forty-eight additional weekly pay
ments will make up for her lost earning potential. However, six
months after her injury, she has yet to find a suitable job, and she is
concerned about doing simple household chores with her injury,
such as shoveling snow. Alice's son convinces her to move to Penn
sylvania, where her children can assist her with daily life and where
skilled jobs that Alice can perform are plentiful.
Not long after Alice moves to Pittsburgh, she is notified by the
state of Utopia that she is no longer eligible to receive workers'
compensation payments. The state's Workers' Compensation Act
requires those receiving loss of earning potential payments to be
residents of Utopia. Alice checks with the Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation board to see if its rules would allow her to continue
receiving benefits, but the Pennsylvania statute only applies to
workers who are injured while working in Pennsylvania or for a
Pennsylvania corporation. She checks with a Utopia attorney, and
she tells Alice that the highest court in Utopia has upheld the stat
ute. Alice is shocked. She is disabled due to a work accident that
occurred in Utopia, and she will never be able to earn her former
salary; yet she cannot receive any of the benefits she was formerly
entitled to because she decided to move to another state. Further
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more, her attorney informs her that she cannot sue her former em
ployer for the injury because the Utopia Workers' Compensation
Act precludes suits for covered injuries. l
At present, most states do not treat residents and non-residents
receiving workers' compensation benefits differently. However, a
few states have adopted workers' compensation laws that allow for
such disparate treatment. 2 That number could increase as many
states are currently experiencing a fiscal crisis.3 States may consider
changing workers' compensation laws to encourage employers to
relocate and to help strengthen the economy.4 This Note questions
the constitutionality of workers' compensation systems that reduce
or eliminate payments to recipients who, although otherwise eligi
ble, are no longer residents of the state. Specifically, this Note will
discuss whether such statutes infringe on the constitutional right to
travel and should, therefore, be subject to the same strict scrutiny
review as other statutes that penalize moving from state to state.
This Note begins, in Part I, with a brief primer in workers'
compensation law, including its history and current operation.
Then, Part II gives a history of the right to travel and a discussion of
the impact of recent cases relying on that right. Part III closely ex
amines two cases that have evaluated workers' compensation laws
1. See infra Part I.e.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175 (2002) (out-of-state resident's benefits calculated by
multiplying the in-state compensation rate "by the ratio of the cost of living of the area
in which the recipient resides to the cost of living in this state"); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-308a (2003) (limiting additional benefits for partial permanent disability to those
injured employees who remain "willing and able to perform work" in Connecticut);
NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.455 (2002) (giving a 65% cost-of-living increase to residents of
Nevada who receive compensation for injury that occurred before April 9, 1971).
3. See, e.g., Patrick Crowley, N. Ky.'s Share of Pie in Doubt, CINCINNATI EN·
QUIRER, Jan. 6, 2004, at 1C; Maryellen FilIo, Budget Has Many Seeing Red; Officials
Upset as State Cuts Aid to 100 Municipalities, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 20, 2003, at
B1; Scott S. Greenberger, Legislative Leaders OK $102M Plan Spending Bill Would
Restore Some Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13,2003, at B1; Jordan Rau, State of Uncer
tainty; Pataki Agenda Faces a Wary Legislature, NEWSDAY, Jan. 7, 2004, at A15.
4. For example, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called for "real
workers' comp reform" during his 2004 state of the state address. Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, California State of the State Address, Sacramento, Cal. (Jan. 6, 2004)
(transcript available at http://www.governor.ca.gov!state!govsite!gov_homepage.jsp).
This appeal was part of a list of ways to improve the business climate in California and
to bring new jobs to the state. Id. Other states also see lower workers' compensation
insurance rates as a way to attract new businesses. Charles Stein, Hoping to Mine Gold
from the Golden State Romney, Other Governors See Chance to Woo Firms Away, Bos·
TON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2003, at C1. See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1-118 (2004) (requir
ing a biannual review of the current workers' compensation laws to determine
effectiveness in "controll[ing] or reduc[ing] the cost of workers' compensation
premiums").
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in terms of the right to travel. Finally, in Part IV, this Note argues
that the current right to travel jurisprudence is not sufficiently
broad to evaluate the constitutionality of all penalties on interstate
movement. Specifically, it contends that the three components of
the right articulated in Saenz v. Roe have been narrowly applied in
the workers' compensation cases and as such, do not fully protect
the right to free movement. Part IV also stresses that the current
application of the law fails to further the goals of workers' compen
sation and any attempts to treat workers' compensation like welfare
should be abandoned. Finally, Part IV will argue that strict scrutiny
review is the appropriate test to evaluate the constitutionality of
any workers' compensation statute that takes benefits away from a
recipient solely because they have changed their state of residence.
I.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Workers' compensation is a broad, complex topic. This section
will touch only on the areas that are critical to the discussion of the
right to travel issue. s First, Part I.A explores the history of workers'
compensation, explaining that it was created to allow workers to
recover for on-the-job injuries in a predictable way from employers
and to ensure that injured workers did not become burdens to the
state. Part I.B attempts to clarify the nature of workers' compensa
tion by contrasting it with tort recoveries and social insurance pro
grams like welfare. Workers' compensation is further defined in
Part I.C by a discussion of its quid pro quo characteristics, that an
employee may collect from the employer without a finding of fault,
but in return the employer is shielded from all lawsuits arising from
the action. In other words, in exchange for a guaranteed remedy,
the employee receives an exclusive remedy. Finally, Part I.D ex
plains the role of state statutes in determining eligibility and bene
fits. While an employee may be able to look to a number of state
statutes for a determination of benefits, it is always the employer
who pays, either directly or through its insurer.
A.

Historical Background and Underlying Purposes

Before the nineteenth century, employers were never liable in
tort for on-the-job injuries suffered by employees. 6 Indeed, most
5. For a more complete treatment of the topic, see

LEX

K.
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LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW; CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT

&

ARTHUR

(3d ed., Lexis

Publishing 2000) [hereinafter LARSON & LARSON, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT].
6. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Work
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people were considered fortunate just to be employed. The risk of
injury was part of the job, and there was no shortage of people will
ing to take that risk. 7
The first reported employer liability cases - in England in
18378 and in the United States in 1841 9 - ended in findings for the
employers. However, even though it also found for the employer,
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad lO set the stage for tort suits
against employers when employees were injured, not due to their
own misconduct, but because of some shortcoming in the way the
employer conducted his business.l1 However, the ability to sue did
not necessarily mean success. The common law defenses to negli
gence of assumption of risk,12 contributory negligence,13 and the
fellow-servant rule 14 proved to be formidable obstacles rarely over
ers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 777 (1982) (explaining that the absence of
pre-nineteenth century cases strongly suggests that "no employee could ever recover
from any employer for any workplace accident").
7. Id. at 777-78.
8. Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837) (refusing to hold employer
responsible for the negligence of an employee that caused injury to another employee).
9. Murray v. South Carolina R.R, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841) (rejecting
plaintiff's claim against defendant railroad because the injury was caused by the negli
gence of another employee, not the owner of the railroad himself).
10. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
11. Id. at 62. The employer was not found liable in this case because the miscon
duct of the injured employee's co-worker actually caused the injury. However, the
court left the door open for liability in cases of negligence by the employer. Id. "We are
far from intending to say that there are no implied warranties and undertakings arising
out of the relation of master and servant." Id. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 778-84 for a
detailed discussion of Farwell.
12. An assumption of risk defense claimed that the employee understood the
risks inherent in the workplace and, in essence, released the employer from liability
when the employee accepted the job. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Conn. River Paper Co., 29 N.E.
464,465 (Mass. 1891) ("[A] servant assumes the obvious risks of the service into which
he enters, even if the business be ever so dangerous ...."). This rule was softened in
some jurisdictions when courts held that an employee could not assume the risk of an
employer violating a safety statute. E.g., Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co., 96 F. 298,305 (6th Cir. 1899) (holding that where employer violated statue enacted
for protection of employees, the employee who continued working with knowledge of
the violation did not assume risk); Fitzwater v. Warren, 99 N.E. 1042, 1042 (N.Y. 1912)
("[P]ubJic policy precludes an employee from assuming the risk created by a violation
of the statute or waiving liability of the master for injuries caused thereby."). But see,
e.g., Denver & RG.R Co. v. Norgate, 141 F. 247, 252-54 (8th Cir. 1905) (stating that a
safety statute cannot repeal the common law defense of assumption of risk unless spe
cifically stated in the statute).
13. Contributory negligence rendered the plaintiff completely unable to recover if
he was at least partially at fault for his injuries. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 65, at 451-62 (5th ed. 1984).
14. The fellow-servant rule was used to find against the plaintiff in Farwell and
stood for the proposition that if another employee was at fault for the accident, the
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come by injured employees.1 5
The growth of industry in the late nineteenth century meant
that workplaces became home to more machinery, which in turn
became a breeding-ground for accidents. Indeed, during the time
of the Industrial Revolution, the number of work-related injuries
increased sharply.16
However, the plight of the injured industrial worker did not go
unnoticed. In 1884, Germany became the first country to enact
workers' compensation lawsP Other industrialized countries soon
followed suit. In the United States, New York enacted the first
state workers' compensation laws in 1910.1 8 By 1963, all fifty states
had adopted such acts.19
Until 1917, legislatures feared that workers' compensation stat
utes would be held unconstitutional on the grounds that their com
pulsory and no-fault nature amounted to a taking of the employers'
property without due process of law. 20 Indeed, New York's system
was held to violate the state constitution for that reason in 1911.21
Because of this constitutional crisis, several states adopted "elec
employer could not be held liable. See Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 62. Some jurisdic
tions attempted to temper this rule in favor of the injured employee by creating exclu
sions. See, e.g., N. Pac. RR v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1886) (stating the "well
settled" rule that it is the duty of the employer to provide safe working conditions and
to hire competent people and that the delegation of these duties will not shield the
employer from liability through the fellow-servant rule); Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31
Ohio St. 287, 292-93 (1877) (holding that the acts of a supervisor, even when "perform
ing the duty of a common workman" will not exonerate the employer under the fellow
servant rule).
15. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 569. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K.
LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 2.03 (2003) [hereinafter LARSON
& LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW]; Matthew B. Duckworth,S 1. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 403, 406 (2001).
16. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 2.07.
17. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 573 n.46.
18. Maryland and Montana passed earlier, narrower acts in 1902 and 1909 respec
tively, but they were short-lived. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW,
supra note 15, at § 2.07.
19. Id. at § 2.08.
20. Id. at § 2.07. Due process requires that a person charged with liability have
the opportunity to refute the charges and have his defenses heard in a court of law
before his property is taken. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The argument here was
that since employers had to compensate accident victims virtually automatically, they
were not given that opportunity. See Ives v. S. Buffalo RR, 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
21. Ives, 94 N.E. at 431. New York amended its constitution to allow for compul
sory workers' compensation systems and soon after enacted another statute. LARSON &
LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15 at § 2.07.
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tive" statutes, which allowed employers to opt-out of the system. 22
By opting-out, an employer could be sued by an injured employee
and could not assert the usual common law defenses. 23 In 1917,
however, a trio of Supreme Court cases firmly established the con
stitutionality of compulsory workers' compensation systems. 24
Since then, the states have adopted varied statutes, creating a
patchwork of benefits, requirements, and exceptions. 25 In 1972, the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
presented its report, which recommended standards for state pro
grams. 26 The commission recommended federalization of these
standards with sanctions for states that did not comply by 1975,27
but no such federal legislation has been adopted, "in part because
no device could be invented that would be both effective and politi
callyacceptable."28 Nonetheless, many states have used these stan
dards as benchmarks, perhaps to stave off the threatened
federalization. 29
In addition to suggesting standards for state programs, the re
port acknowledged common purposes served by the workers' com
pensation system. It listed four major objectives for modern
programs: "Broad coverage of employees and of work-related inju
ries and diseases," "[s]ubstantial protection against interruption of
income," "[p]rovision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation
22.
§ 2.07.

LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at

23. Id. Only New Jersey and Texas continue to operate under an elective system
today. STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2003
ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 10-13 (2003).
24. Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v.
Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917); N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). It is
beyond the scope of this Note to examine the intricate constitutional arguments sur
rounding these cases; suffice it to say that it is well established that compulsory workers'
compensation systems are constitutional, and the system is flourishing today. LARSON
& LARSON, CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT, supra note 5, at 24.
25. See generally STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23 (charts com
paring state workers' compensation programs throughout pUblication).
26. THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COM.
PENSATION LAWS, Washington, D.C., July 1972. This commission was established by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 84 Stat. 1616 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.c.A.
§ 676 (West 2003) but omitted from the United States Code). The commission ceased
to exist ninety days after the final report was transmitted to the President and Congress.
29 U.S.C.A. § 676 (West 2003).
27. THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COM
PENSATION LAWS, supra note 26, at 26.
28. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at § 2.08
(2003).
29.

Id.
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services," and "[e]ncouragement of safety."3o The report also rec
ognized that "an effective system for delivery of the benefits and
services" was essential to attain these objectives. 31
Today, workers' compensation is firmly embedded in this coun
try's social, industrial, and statutory framework. While differing
somewhat in scope and detail, every state provides this protection
for injured workers and their employers. 32 Even with these dispari
ties, state programs can be generalized according to what injuries
are covered, how benefits are calculated, and whether damage suits
may be brought. Nevertheless, workers' compensation as a whole
remains a mongrel, leading to confusion when compared to tort and
social insurance. 33 This next section will attempt to alleviate that
confusion.
B.

What is Workers' Compensation? Distinguishing Tort and
Social Insurance

Workers' compensation plans are extremely difficult to catego
rize. Workers' compensation is not a system for tort recovery, and
it is not "social insurance." Instead, it embodies many of the fea
tures of both but also differs in very important ways.34 This section
will compare and contrast workers' compensation with tort actions
and social insurance.
1.

Distinguishing Workers' Compensation from Tort
Recovery

While workers' compensation seeks to compensate personal
injuries like tort actions, the system does not carry with it a fault
component. 35 Indeed, even a very clumsy or careless employee
30. THE REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COM·
PENSATION LAWS, supra note 26, at IS.
31. Id.
32. STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 15-23.
33. "Almost every major error that can be observed in the development of com
pensation law ... can be traced to the importation of tort ideas, or ... to the assumption
that the right to compensation resembles the right to the proceeds of a personal insur
ance policy." LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.02.

34. Id.
35. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045 (2002) ("Compensation is payable irre
spective of fault as a cause for the injury."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-401 (2002)
("Every employer should secure compensation to its employees and payor provide
compensation for their disability or death from compensable injury arising out of and in
the course of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury."); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-1503 (1998) ("Every employer subject to this chapter shall be liable for com
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may recover when he is injured while working for the most careful
and non-negligent employer.36 However, this should not be con
fused with pure strict liability.37 The crucial but subtle difference is
an added requirement of a "work connection" for workers' com
pensation eligibility.38 Additionally, typical defenses to strict liabil
ity, such as acts of God and acts of third persons, are not available
in workers' compensation. 39
In another important contrast to tort, workers' compensation
bases its awards only on injuries that diminish an employee's earn
ing capacity. In this way, the compensation does not attempt to
restore the injured worker to the position he would have been in
had the injury not occurred, as it does in tort recoveries. Instead,
the system establishes an amount that will ensure the employee will
not become a burden to society.40 Payments are based solely on a
pensation for injury or death without regard to fault as a cause of the injury or death.");
IDAHO CODE § 72-201 (1999) ("[S]ure and certain relief for injured workmen and their
families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault."); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2003) ("It is an objective of the Montana workers' compensa
tion system to provide, without regard to fault, wage supplement and medical benefits
to a worker suffering from a work-related injury or disease."); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 406.031 (1996) ("An insurance carrier is liable for compensation for an employee's
injury without regard to fault or negligence ....").
36. LARSON & LARSON, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, supra note 5, at 4-5. Cf
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (2002) (denying compensation where injury was self-in
flicted or caused by employee's intoxication).
37. Keeton defines strict liability as "liability that is imposed on an actor apart
from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a justifica
tion for doing so, or (2) a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 13, § 75, at 534. While this is also true of employers' liability in workers'
compensation, Keeton points out that there is a subtle distinction, calling it a "form of
strict liability." Employers are not responsible for all injuries to employees, but only
those that are work-related. Id. at 573.
38. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.03[i]. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (2003) (defining injury as "any
injury ... received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employ
ment"); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-6-102 (2003) (covering only injuries that are "arising
out of and in the course of employment"); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.031 (1996)
(limiting coverage to those injuries that "arise[] out of and in the course and scope of
employment").
39. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.03[3]. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-901 (1995) (covering injuries "caused by the wil
ful act of a third person directed against an employee because of the employee's em
ployment"); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1 (1998) (exempting only those willful acts of third
persons that are personal in nature, as opposed to associated with employment). But see
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032 (2003) (no liability for injuries that "arose out of an
act of God, unless the employment exposes the employee to a greater risk of injury
from an act of God than ordinarily applies to the general public").
40. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.03[5]. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2003) ("Wage-loss benefits are not
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percentage of the employee's pre-injury wages, making the amount
not completely arbitrary, but with some basis in the employee's for
mer economic position. 41 However, in keeping with the goal of
merely protecting the injured employee from destitution, payments
are often capped at the average wage for all workers in the area. 42
Pain and suffering is not considered in benefit calculation, nor are
injuries that do not impact earning potentia1. 43 Personal expenses
not directly related to the health of the employee are likewise not
covered. 44
Also, the employee does not "own" the unpaid balance in an
award to be paid in installments. 45 It cannot be devised or assigned,
nor can it be attached for obligations like child support or ali
mony.46 An injured employee's heirs have no claim on any unpaid
benefits when the employee dies before receiving the fixed number
of payments for his injury.47 The rationale for this lies in the theory
that workers' compensation benefits are provided to replace the
employee's lost earning capacity and to ensure that he or she is not
intended to make an injured worker whole; they are intended to assist a worker at a
reasonable cost to the employer.").
41. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2003) (stating that "wage-loss bene
fit should bear a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost as a result of a work
related injury or disease").
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-68 (2003) (maximum weekly benefit $220.00 or
100% of the average weekly wage for the state); GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-9-261 (1998)
(temporary total disability payments are two-thirds of the employee's average weekly
wage with a minimum of $42.50 and a maximum of $425.00).
43. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.03[4]. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1044 (1995) (determining amount of benefits
based solely on diminished capacity to do work); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-522 (2002)
("The guide shall not include pain as a basis for impairment."). For example, a woman
whose only injury is that she can no longer bear children will not be able to recover
under the typical workers' compensation systems because this injury does not impact
the ability to work or earning capacity.
44. See, e.g., Kerr v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 529 A.2d 62, 63 (Pa.
1987) (disallowing $18,303.89 of personal losses incurred while awaiting adjudication of
workers' compensation award).
45. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.03[6].
46. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1068 (1995) ("[C]ompensation is ex
empt from attachment, garnishment and execution and does not pass to another person
by operation of law."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-42-124 (2003) ("[C]laims for com
pensation or benefits ... shall not be assigned, released, or commuted ... and shall be
exempt from all claims of creditors ....").
47. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 89.03. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1068 (1995) (allowing for any unpaid ben
efits that remain at death to be paid to the employee's personal representative).
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subject to poverty.48 Once the employee dies, there exists neither a
need to supplement his or her earnings nor a danger of the em
ployee becoming a burden to society. Most statutes do provide that
the injured employee's dependents will continue to receive benefits
upon his or her death.49 However, these payments end when the
dependents die or reach majority and no longer rely on the em
ployee's earning potential for surviva1. 50
Finally, workers' compensation is not designed to punish the
employer who is liable. 51 Fault is not determined, so there is no
"wrong" behavior to deter or correct through punishment. 52 The
compensation paid to the injured employee is not supposed to
"hurt" the employer.53 In economic theory, the cost of compensat
ing workplace accidents should fall to consumers through increased
prices required to pay for employers' workers' compensation
insurance.54
Workers' compensation differs greatly from tort remedies.
Workers' compensation requires no finding of fault, establishes
benefits based on the worker's former income - rather than actual
loss due to the injury - and does not act to punish the employer.
Indeed, such characterization could lead to a belief that workers'
compensation is a form of social welfare. The next section attempts
to dispel that belief. 55
2.

Distinguishing Workers' Compensation from Social
Insurance

Even though workers' compensation is very similar to social
insurance programs like welfare, workers' compensation may be
readily distinguished because payments are not based on actual
48.

LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at

§ 89.03. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

49.

LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at

§ 1.03[6].

50. See Belcher v. Vulcan Materials Co., 359 So. 2d 383, 385 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)
(widow not entitled to receive dependant benefits after she remarried and her children
reached 18 years of age), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 386 (Ala. 1978).
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.03[7].
54. Id.
55. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 568 (stating that workers' compensa
tion statutes "do not rest upon any theory of tort liability, but upon one of social
insurance").
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need. 56 Rather, the benefits are a "compromise between actual loss
of earning capacity and arbitrary presumptions of the amount
needed for support."57 Compensation schedules in workers' com
pensation statutes base benefits on a percentage of current wages
and impose an upper limit for benefits to be paid over a maximum
number of weeks.58 These schedules do not take into account cir
cumstances such as marital status, number of children, or current
monetary obligations. 59
Additionally, benefits are not paid from state treasuries, so the
cost of the program is not borne by the public at large. Employers
either pay the benefits directly or they take part in insurance plans
that will cover payouts. In either case, the cost is passed on to the
consumers of the employer's products. 6o Thus, consumers of prod
ucts made in industries or by employers particularly prone to indus
trial accidents will pay proportionately more than consumers of
products made in inherently safer industries. 61 Nonetheless, the
cost of workers' compensation is not being paid by taxes levied
56. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.04[3]. But see KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 568.
57. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.04[3].
58. Id. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-307 (2003) (total incapacity weekly
compensation equal to seventy-five percent of employee's average weekly earnings, for
the "period of total incapacity"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 34 (2003) (total
incapacity weekly compensation equal to sixty percent of the employee's average
weekly wage before the injury, not to exceed 156 weeks); NEB. REv. STAT. 48-121
(2003) (partial disability compensation equal to "sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the
difference between the wages received at the time of the injury and the earning power
of the employee thereafter," not to exceed 300 weeks); S.c. CODE ANN. § 42-9-10
(2003) (total disability weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of
employee's average weekly wages, not to exceed 500 weeks). Many statutes also list
specific compensation levels for the loss of certain body parts, usually paid in addition
to temporary partial disability compensation. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23
1044 (1995) (for loss of hearing in one ear, fifty-five percent of average monthly wage
for twenty months; for loss of hearing in both ears, fifty-five percent of average monthly
wage for sixty months); NEB. REV. STAT. 48-121 (2003) (for thumb, sixty-six and two
thirds percent of daily wages for sixty weeks; for great toe, sixty-six and two-thirds of
daily wages for thirty weeks); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-207 (2003) (for loss of eye,
sixty-six and two thirds percent of average weekly wage for one hundred weeks; for loss
of eye and arm, sixty-six and two thirds percent of average weekly wage for 350 weeks).
59. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.04[3]. But see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 35A (2003) (allowing for additional
payments of six dollars per week for each dependant, provided that the total payment
does not exceed the average weekly wage of the employee or one hundred fifty dollars,
whichever is smaller).
60. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 1.04[2].
61. Id.
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against all citizens of a state; it is a cost of doing business. This
feature of workers' compensation represents a stark contrast to so
cial insurance.
C.

Exclusivity of Remedy

For injured employees covered by a state's workers' compensa
tion act, benefits under the act are the sole available remedy.62
Even if the employee does not choose to claim benefits, he is still
precluded by statute from filing suit against the employer.63 In al
most every case, a covered employee is barred from bringing both
common law tort and statutory claims against an employer.64 Even
statutes particularly targeting worker protection, such as the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act65 and the federal Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,66 will not give rise to
a private action if the implicated injury is covered by a state's work
ers' compensation act. 67
The converse of the exclusivity principle is also true: an em
ployer may be liable for injuries that are not covered by the act.
This seems only logical since the rationale behind exclusivity is that
the employee is guaranteed benefits in return for the forfeiture of
the right to sue. 68 Therefore, if the employee is not entitled to ben
62. Id. at § 100.01[1]. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987); Kinchloe v. Aero Commander, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 32, 37
(W.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975); Henderson v. State, 715 P.2d 978,
979 (Idaho 1986); Lindsay v. Crohan, 508 A.2d 674 (R.1. 1986).
63. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 100.01[4). See, e.g., Shelby v. Truck & Bus Group Div. of General Motors Corp., 533
N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Holody v. City of Detroit, 323 N.W.2d 599 (Mich. Ct.
App.1982).
64. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 100.03[1). The exception to this is federal and state anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1105 (10th Cir. 1998) (concerning
TItle VII); Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding workers'
compensation barred common law tort suit, but not suit for emotional damages result
ing for discrimination in violation of Missouri Human Rights Act).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2003) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to su
persede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law ....").
66. 29 U.S.c. § 1854(d)(I) (2003) ("[W]here a State workers' compensation law is
applicable and coverage is provided for a migrant or seasonal agricultural worker, the
workers' compensation benefits shall be the exclusive remedy for loss of such worker
under this Act in the case of bodily injury or death ....").
67. The exclusivity provision in the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act was added after the Supreme Court ruled that the Act, before the
amendment, showed no congressional intent to limit its coverage for injuries covered by
workers' compensation. See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
68. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 100.Q1.
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efits because the injury is not covered by the act, he or she should
not be required to give up that right.69 Many examples of this type
of situation exist, and most involve injuries that occurred at work
but not in the course of employment. 7o
However, a critical distinction must be made from those cases
where the injury is technically covered by the statute, but because
of the injury's nature, no benefits are payable. In these cases, the
undoubtedly work-related injury does not impair the employee's
earning capacity.71 Since the goal of workers' compensation is to
ensure that the injured employee can still provide adequately for
his or her livelihood, there is no need to compensate these injuries.
The statute does cover these injuries; the injured employee may not
bring tort claims against the employer.72
Additionally, the exclusivity rule will bar common-law suits
where the statute of limitations has run,73 or a statutory require
ment has not been met.7 4 For example, in the Anaconda Case,15 a
miner attempted to secure benefits under the Occupational Disease
69. "[R]ights of action for damages should not be deemed taken away except
when something of value has been put in its place." Id. at § 100.04. See also Potts v.
UAP-GA. AG. Chern., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Ga. 1998) (finding that employee's
action in tort was not precluded because Georgia's act provided no coverage for injuries
resulting from employer's fraudulent statements to doctors about employee's exposure
to chemicals); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 361-63 (Or. 2001) (hold
ing that where benefits were denied because plaintiff failed to prove his work-related
exposure to chemicals was the "major contributing cause" of his injury, plaintiff entitled
to bring suit under Oregon's Remedies Clause guaranteeing citizens a right to redress
for injuries).
70. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No.1, 631 N.W.2d 510 (Neb.
2001) (finding that teacher could bring personal injury suit for injury occurring when
she came back to school at night with her husband, a band director, to return borrowed
computer equipment because it was a personal, not work-related visit); McBride v. Her
shey Chocolate Corp., 188 A.2d 775 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (holding that exclusivity did
not bar suit against employer for failing to control co-employee who assaulted plaintiff;
conflict between employees was personal and therefore the injury did not arise in the
course of employment).
71. The most common examples of this are found in cases where reproductive
organs have been injured. See, e.g., Hyett v. Northwestern Hosp. for Women & Chil
dren, 180 N.W. 552 (Minn. 1920) (finding that employee's work related injury to pubic
nerve, rendering him impotent, did not entitle him to compensation). But see Spyhalsky
v. Cross Constr., 743 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (stating that, while tort action
was barred, payments of medical expenses for artificial insemination of wife were
granted). See also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
72. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 100.05[1].
73. See Kane v. Durotest Corp., 182 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1962).
74. Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982).
75. Anaconda Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Second Judicial Dist., In and For County of Sil
ver Bow, 506 P.2d 81 (Mont. 1973).
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Act relating to his contraction of silicosis. The Act, however, re
quired that an employee be exposed to silicon for a minimum of
1,000 shifts to be eligible for benefits.76 The miner was denied ben
efits and was also barred from a tort claim because his injury was
technically covered by the Act.77

D. Issues of Conflicts of Law and Eligibility
When an employee qualifies for benefits under a workers'
compensation statute, the benefits are paid either by the employer
directly or by the employer's insurer.78 When more than one state
has an interest in the injury, the question arises: which state's stat
ute will apply?79 A discussion of the resolution of such conflicts of
law is beyond the scope of this Note.
However, two important points must be made here. First, re
gardless of what state's law applies to the determination of benefits
for the injured employee, the employer must pay those benefits, ei
ther directly or through its insurance. 8o The state itself does not pay
the benefits out of its general funds. The question of which state's
law applies does not alter who pays the benefits.
Second, state laws vary in their requirements for applicability,
but they all require some kind of connection to the state at the time
of the injury.81 In general, a question only arises when the em
ployee is injured while working in another state since the injury it
self is typically enough of a connection to trigger the applicability of
76. Id. at 84.
77. Id. at 85. This case was overturned by Gidley v. W.R. Grace & Co., 717 P.2d
21,22-23 (1986) (interpreting the Montana statute stating that there is "no common-law
right of action for occupational disease against an employer ... excepting for those
employees not eligible for compensation under ... this act" to mean that employees
whose injuries did not meet the requirements were able to sue).
78. Some states allow employers to choose between self and commercial insur
ance, while others require employers to carry commercial insurance. STATISTICS AND
REsEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 10-13. Ohio and North Dakota maintain a state
run fund for workers' compensation benefits, funded by the employers in the state. Id.
79. A complicated example is the situation in Daniels v. Trailer Transp. Co., 42
N.W.2d 828 (Mich. 1950). The employee in that case lived in Illinois and made a con
tract for employment in Texas with a company based in Michigan. The company had
operations in various states, and the employee traveled extensively in his work. He was
injured in Tennessee. The court held that even though the employee signed a contract
stating that Michigan's workers' compensation law would apply, Michigan's statute was
not applicable. Id. at 830.
80. Cf STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 10-13 (indicating
that all states provide for penalties for failure to insure).
81. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 101.04[3].
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the statute. 82 The common threads of the applicability require
ments center on the place of employment, the place of the em
ployer's headquarters, and the place where the employment
contract was made. 83 Less often, a state will consider the residence
of the employee. 84
From these principles, it is clear that when an employee travels
to another state to work for his employer, coverage by some state
statute travels with him or her, either by virtue of the statute in the
employer's home state, or because the statute in the state of injury
will apply to any injury that occurs within its borders. The question
posed in this Note is: what happens when an employee moves after
they are injured? Clearly, the statute that applied to them at the
time of injury will still govern their benefits.85 But is it permissible
for a state to declare that it will no longer require the employer to
pay benefits to the employee, once they have left the state? To
answer this question, this Note will first explore the history and de
velopment of the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel among
the states.

II.

HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

The idea that citizens of the United States have a fundamental
right to travel originated in the Articles of Confederation,86 and the
particulars of the scope and constitutional source of this right have
82. Id. at § 101.05[3].
83. Id.; STATISTICS AND RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 23, at 8. The Alaska
statute offers a clear example of extraterritorial coverage provisions:
(a) If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of this state,
suffers an injury on account of which the employee, or in the event of the
employee's death, the employee's dependents, would have been entitled to the
benefits provided by this chapter had the injury occurred in this state, the em
ployee or, in the event of the employee's death resulting from the injury, the
employee's dependents shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this chap
ter, if at the time of the injury (1) the employee's employment is principally
localized in this state; (2) the employee is working under a contract of hire
made in this state in employment not principally localized in any state; (3) the
employee is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment
principally localized in another state whose workers' compensation law is not
applicable to the employee's employer; or (4) the employee is working under a
contract of hire made in this state for employment outside the United States
and Canada.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.011 (2002) (emphasis added).
84. LARSON & LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 15, at
§ 101.04[2].
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 114.
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been the source of debate ever since. 87 Part IIA discusses how the
Supreme Court first recognized and justified the right to travel as a
component of the Commerce Clause. Next, Part lIB looks at more
recent developments in the right to travel based on the Equal Pro
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This part will high
light three important "right to travel" cases, Shapiro v.
Thompson,88 Dunn v. Blumstein,89 and Memorial Hospital v. Mari
copa County,90 in which the Court established and clarified the
right of a newly arrived state citizen to be treated in the same man
ner as long-time residents. Part II.C examines Saenz v. Roe,91 the
most recent Supreme Court "right to travel" decision. This section
centers on the Court's shift in emphasis to the Privileges and Immu
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and on the establish
ment of three "components" of the right to travel.
A.

Early Development Through the Commerce Clause

While the Constitution does not articulate a specific "right to
travel," judicial discussions of such a right can be found as early as
1823 in Corfield v. Coryeli,92 a decision by a Pennsylvania federal
court regarding a New Jersey statute disallowing the taking of oys
ters by non-residents. The court upheld the statute as constitu
tional, and Justice Washington, in his opinion, enumerated a
number of rights the court thought to be "fundamental. "93 The list
included "[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, profes
sional pursuits, or otherwise."94
The Supreme Court's first mention of the fundamental nature
of moving from one state to another came in an 1849 dissent by
87. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed his disagreement with the
Court's articulation of the scope of the right to travel in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe.
Compare Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 514-16 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) with
discussion infra Part II.C.
88. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
89. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
90. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
91. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
92. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
93. Justice Washington defined the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states" as those that are "in their nature, fundamental." Id. at 551.
94. Id. at 552. Other rights articulated were "[p]rotection by the government,"
"life and liberty," "to acquire and possess property," "to pursue and obtain happiness,"
"to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus," "the right to bring suit in state
courts," and "the elective franchise." Id. at 551-52.
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Chief Justice Taney.95 In the Passenger Cases, the Court consoli
dated two cases, Smith v. Turner and Norris v. City of Boston,
which challenged fees paid by vessel masters for every passenger
brought into the New York and Boston ports, respectively.96 The
Court did not rest its opinion on the right to travel, but instead
struck down the fees as unconstitutional restrictions on interstate
commerce. 97 However, both the majority and the dissent recog
nized the fundamental nature of the ability to move among the
states in the union without impediment. 98
Two decades later, in 1867, the Court used infringement on the
right to travel as grounds for finding a state law unconstitutional in
Crandall v. Nevada. 99 The statute in question required a fee from
any passengers leaving the state of Nevada,lOo the opposite of the
fee requirement in the Passenger Cases. The Court made clear its
belief that a nation made up of many states, but with one central
seat of government, could not function if states were free to place
restrictions or taxes on citizens crossing state borders to reach the
place of government. IOl The Court declined to follow the lower
court's lead and decide the case based on either the Commerce
Clause, which forbids the states from regulating interstate com
merce, or the clause that prohibits states from laying duties on im
ports or exports. 102 Instead, the Court rested its decision solely on
the right to travel and fully embraced Chief Justice Taney's words in
the Passenger Cases .103 The Court cited the Crandall holding in
95. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, c.J.,
dissenting).
96. /d. at 392-93, 409.
97. Id. at 409-10. The Supreme Court has inferred from the constitutional grant
of power to regulate interstate commerce to Congress that states may not enact laws
that place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, d. 3;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824) ("[W]hen a State proceeds to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the
very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is
authorized to do."). See generally IRWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCI·
PLES AND POLICIES 401-34 (Aspen Publishers 1997).
98. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492 (Taney, c.J., dissenting) ("We
are all citizens of the United States ... [and] must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.").
99. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,43-50 (1867) (holding as unconstitutional a fee levied on
all passengers leaving Nevada).
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at 43-44. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 1 ("The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, ... but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
102. Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43.
103. Id. at 48-49. See supra note 98.
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subsequent cases, and the fundamental right to travel was born. 104
While the Court has never denied the existence of the right to
travel,105 it has struggled to give the right a constitutional
"home."106 At first, the Court grounded the right on the Com
merce Clause, which prohibits states from regulating or interfering
with interstate commerce.1 07 In Edwards v. California, the Court
held unconstitutional a state statute making it a misdemeanor to
bring an "indigent" into the state of California. lOS It reasoned that
the movement of persons across state lines was a component of in
terstate commerce, and thus any restriction on that movement by a
state was an impermissible regulation. 109
The Court again addressed the right to travel in terms of the
104. Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58
(1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 294 n.10 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
126 (1958); Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 178-79 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496, 520-21 n.1 (1939); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 430 (1935); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); The Slaugh
ter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873).
105. No reported cases show disagreement with the general principle of the right
to travel as a fundamental right. Gregory B. Hartch, Comment, Wrong Turns: A Cri
tique of the Supreme Court's Right to Travel Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 458
(1995).
106. For a thorough examination of the constitutional source of the right to
travel, see Lonnie Shirl Thrner, The Right to Travel and the Problem of Unenumerated
Constitutional Rights (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Los Angeles, on file with the Western New England College School of Law Library).
Thrner concludes that there are several sources, and "each protects travel in a different
way and to a different degree." Id. at ix. Thrner further explains that establishing the
source of this unenumerated right will help to define the scope of the right and better
protect it from future judicial challenges. Id. at 5-8. See also Karin Fromson Segall,
Note, Federal Courts: It's Not Black and White: Spencer v. Casavilla and the Use of the
Right of Intrastate Travel in Section 1985(3), 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 473, 480-95 (1991).
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
109. Id. at 172. Although the decision was unanimous, only five justices joined
the majority opinion grounding the right to travel in the Commerce Clause. Three of
the other justices believed that the right of citizens to travel should have "a more pro
tected position" than the movement of goods. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined
by Black, J., and Murphy, J.). They asserted that the right to travel is a national right of
itself and should have its own protection apart from any clause of the Constitution. Id.
at 181. Justice Jackson, in his lone concurrence, rested the right to travel on the Privi
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 182-83 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITU
TION OF 1787, at 189-93 (University of Kansas Press 1956) for a thorough discussion of
these different opinions. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
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Commerce Clause in United States v. Guest. 110 This time, instead of
examining a statute that was alleged to infringe on that right, the
Court upheld an indictment against individuals who were charged
with "conspir[ing] to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any cit
izen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege se
cured to him by the Constitution ... of the United States."l11 One
of the counts in the indictment was for depriving black citizens of
"[t]he right to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia."112
The lower court found the indictment did not charge an offense
under the law,113 presumably on the belief that the Constitution did
not secure the right to travel in and out of the state. In upholding
the indictment, the Court strongly reaffirmed the notion of a funda
mental right to travel but stopped short of establishing its Constitu
tional source. 114

B. A Change of Focus: Equal Protection
A trio of cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s signaled a shift
in the focus of the right to travel from mere border crossings to how
a citizen exercising that right would be treated upon arrival in the
new state. Shapiro v. Thompson,115 Dunn v. Blumstein,116 and Me
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County117 all involved state statutes
110. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
111. [d. at 747 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 241 (1964».
112. Id. at 748.
113. [d. at 747-48.
114. Id. at 758-59. This Court mentioned the thorny issue that the Articles of
Confederation specifically provided that "the people of each State shall have free in
gress and regress to and from any other State," but this statement was not included in
the Constitution. [d. at 758; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. The attorney for
New York in The Passenger Cases made this point, arguing that power over ingress and
egress must have initially rested with the States, since the Articles purported to limit it.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 356 (1849). The Constitution's omission of
this limitation, he claimed, must have been a conscious reallocation back to the States.
Id. The Court in Guest speculated that the drafters of the Constitution believed the
right to travel "so elementary" to a union of states that it did not merit specific mention.
Guest, 383 U.S. at 758. For an argument that the framers of the Constitution could not
have meant to exclude this right but instead believed it was "already embodied else
where and left it out as superfluous," see CHAFEE, supra note 109, at 184-87.
115. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of
Columbia statutes requiring one-year state residency for receiving welfare benefits),
overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
116. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating a Tennessee statute requiring one-year
state residency to vote in state elections).
117. 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating an Arizona statute requiring one-year
county residency for indigents to be eligible for free non-emergency care at that
county's hospital).
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requmng minimum residency periods before new citizens could
take advantage of certain benefits or privileges. Shapiro set out the
test to be used by later durational residency cases, and Dunn and
Maricopa clarified and narrowed the scope of the right to travel.
Shapiro consolidated challenges to three statutes that required
twelve months of consecutive residency for welfare benefits eligibil
ity.118 In its analysis, the Court admitted that the challenged wait
ing-periods fulfilled the legislative intent "to preserve the fiscal
integrity of state public assistance programs" inasmuch as the state
would not be required to serve a large "influx of indigent newcom
ers."119 However, the Court stated that "inhibiting migration by
needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible" and
grounded this in the right to travel. 120
The Court could have stopped with this holding and with its
invocation of United States v. Jackson: "If a law has 'no other pur
pose ... than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penal
izing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently
unconstitutional.' "121
118. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 621-22. The Connecticut Welfare Department, by stat
ute, denied Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to a 19-year-old
single mother because she had not yet lived in Connecticut for a full year. Id. at 622-23.
The challenge to the District of Columbia statute involved three citizens denied AFDC
benefits and one citizen denied Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled benefits.
The denials were based on a statute that required one full year of residency prior to
applying for benefits. Id. at 623-25. The third challenge involved two Pennsylvania re
sidents denied AFDC benefits because they had not been residents for at least one
year. Id. at 625-26. In the Connecticut and Pennsylvania cases, the lower courts held
the statutes to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 623, 626. The District Court for the District of Columbia used the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to hold the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 625.
119. Id. at 627-28. The Court quoted sponsors and defenders of the statutes to
show that the underlying intent was to avoid attracting indigents. Id. For example, the
sponsor of the Connecticut statute said during debate: "I doubt that Connecticut can
and should continue to allow unlimited migration into the state on the basis of offering
instant money and permanent income to all who can make their way to the state regard
less of their ability to contribute to the economy." Id. at 629 (quoting H. B. 82, Con
necticut General Assembly House Proceedings, February Special Session, 1965, Vol. II,
pt. 7, p. 3504).
120. Id. at 629-31. The Court stated it had no reason to establish the constitu
tional source of the right to interstate travel. Id. at 630 ("We have no occasion to
ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provi
sion."). Instead, it relied on the previous assertion by the Court in Guest that the right
to travel is "a right so elementary" that it does not need a specific mention in the Con
stitution. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
121. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968», overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1991) on the ground that
the 11th Amendment forbids court-ordered retroactive payments.
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However, the Court went on to apply the test established in
Skinner v. Oklahoma 122 to determine constitutionality under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,123 Under
that test, also known as "strict scrutiny review," "any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, un
less shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional."124 Pennsylvania and the District of
Columbia contended that the waiting period served the compelling
government interests of better welfare budget planning, supplying
an objective test for bona fide residency, minimizing fraud, and en
couraging new residents to enter the work force quickly.125 The
Court examined these governmental ends and quickly discounted
them as not "compelling." Indeed, because minimum residency re
quirements were not even rationally related to a legitimate end 
the "traditional equal protection [test]" used for classifications that
do not infringe on a fundamental right _126 the Court held that the
classification could not satisfy the more rigorous strict scrutiny re
view, and the statutes had to be struck down.127
Shortly after Shapiro, additional residency requirement cases
gave the Court an opportunity to clarify its position on right to
travel cases. Dunn, in invalidating a one-year residency prerequi
site to voting, added that actual intention to deter interstate travel
was not required to trigger the compelling state interest test,128 As
long as the statute in some way penalized the exercise of the right
to travel, the constitutional right was abridged. 129

Dunn also clarified that the first step in the evaluation of such
a statute was to look at the nature of the classification and the na
ture of the affected individual interests to determine whether either
was fundamental,130 The Court stated that if either the right upon
which the classification was based - in this case, the right to vote 
122. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 532-33.
123. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 638. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
permits the State a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups
of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec
tive."); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
127. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
128. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 335. This was not a pivotal issue in this case since the Court could find
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or the interest affected - the right to travel - was fundamental, the
compelling state interest test would be used. 131 In this case, a one
year residency requirement not only infringed on the right to travel,
but also on the right to vote, so strict scrutiny was clearly the cor
rect standard to applyPZ
Memorial Hospital explained that the Court was looking for
the denial of a "vital" benefit when determining if the right to travel
had been implicated. 133 It noted with approval lower court rulings
that upheld state statutes requiring one-year residency to obtain in
state tuition discounts at state funded colleges. 134 A college educa
tion, while important, was not a "basic necessity of life."13s
After Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital, the courts were
left with a relatively simple Equal Protection analysis for right to
travel cases. If a statute or state regulation was based on a classifi
cation that penalized the exercise of the right to travel by denying a
basic necessity of life, a court was to evaluate it using strict scrutiny
review. 136 If the classification was not necessary to accomplish a
compelling state interest, then the statute would be struck down.137
However, this clarity ended with Saenz v. Roe.B8

little argument that the rights to vote and to travel were anything but fundamental
rights. [d.
131. "[W]hether we look to the benefit withheld by the classification (the oppor
tunity to vote) or the basis for the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude
that [the compelling state interest test must used)." [d. However, Memorial Hospital
later stated that "[t]he amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state
interest test was not made clear" in Shapiro [and Dunn]. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974).
132. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335.
133. Mem'l Hasp., 415 U.S. at 258-60. The Court compared the denial of "basic
[necessities] of life," which had been struck down, with residency requirements for
lower in-state tuition, which had not. From this comparison, the Court determined that
the "necessity" of the benefit being denied was important, even though it did not draw a
bright line: "Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at
least clear that medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as wel
fare assistance." [d. at 259.
134. [d. at 260 n.15. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1973) ("Nor
should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as
one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency
requirement ....").
135. Mem'l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 260 n.15.
136. [d. at 258-60.
137. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 767.
138. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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Finding the Right to Travel in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause

Before Saenz, it would have been safe to say that whenever a
statute penalized someone for exercising his or her right to travel
by moving to a new state by denying a fundamental right or basic
necessity of life, the compelling state interest test would be used.139
However, Saenz cast doubt on this simple summary. Instead of de
nying welfare benefits to new residents, as in Shapiro, the Califor
nia statute in Saenz limited welfare payments to new residents to
the amount they had received in their former state. 140 The Court
began its analysis by again looking for the constitutional source of
the right to travel.1 41 It identified three "components" of the right
to travel: the right to move between the states, the right to not be
treated as an "unfriendly alien" when temporarily in another state,
and the right to be treated in the same way as long-time citizens of a
state when one permanently settles there. 142
Since the first component was not at issue, the Court declined
to attempt to find its source.1 43 However, the Court did not hesi
tate in pinpointing Constitutional protection for the second compo
nent, even though this component, again, was not at issue in the
case. The Court said the right could be found in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, which guarantees that non-re
sidents will not be discriminated against solely because they are re
sidents of other states. l44
In establishing a constitutional home for the third component,
which this case clearly implicated, the Court took a different, per
139. A number of other cases implicated the right to travel in the ensuing years as
well. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993);
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 898 (1986); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Martinez v.
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978). For purposes of this
Note, it is not necessary to go into detail about these cases.
140. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492. For example, if a family that received $225 per
month in welfare benefits in Alabama moved to California, they could only receive a
maximum of $225 from California for the first year of their residency, even if they
qualified for a much higher amount under the California system.
141. Id. at 500.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 501. However, the Court did go on to endorse the view that the right
to travel from one state to another was "conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." Id. (quoting United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966». See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
144. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501-02.
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haps surprising,145 tack. Instead of using the Equal Protection
Clause as it had in Shaprio and its progeny,146 it grounded its deci
sion on the Privileges and Immunities Clause found in the Four
teenth Amendment. The Court explained that this clause gives
United States citizens the right to reside in any state and to have
the same rights and benefits of any other citizen in that state. 147
Thus, the Court found that newly arrived citizens in California must
be given the same opportunity for, and amount of, welfare as any
other current resident. 148
After Saenz, determining whether an enactment penalized the
right to travel seemed simple. If an enactment infringed on one of
the three components, then it was a penalty149 and should be re
viewed using strict scrutiny.150 However, these components do not
address non-residency based benefits administered through state
statutes, such as workers' compensation.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASES

Three state workers' compensation statutes have been chal
lenged on the grounds that they unconstitutionally impinge on the
right to travel. Only two cases, Fisher v. Reiser 151 and McEnerney
v. United States Surgical Corp., 152 were decided in a federal court
based on the U.S. Constitution. 153 Part lILA discusses the first
145. For arguments that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not an appropri
ate application for the right to travel, see Calvert Chipchase, Saenz v. Roe: The Right to
Travel, Durational Residency Requirements, and a Misapplication of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 685 (2001); Dan Wolff, Right Road, Wrong
Vehicle?: Rethinking Thirty Years of the Right to Travel Doctrine: Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.
Ct. 1518 (1999), 25 U. DAYTON L. REv. 307 (2000).
146. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-04.
147. Id. at 503-04. "The States ... do not have any right to select their citizens."
!d. at 511.
148. Id. at 507.
149. Id. at 505 ("But since the right to travel embraces the citizen's right to be
treated equally in her new State of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a
penalty.").
150. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
151. 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980).
152. 805 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
153. The state case was Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264
(Alaska 1984). The Alaska court struck down a provision of the Alaska Workers' Com
pensation program that significantly decreased benefits to injured employees who
moved outside of Alaska as being contrary to the Alaska state constitution. Id. at 269.
The court held that the right to travel was part of the Alaska constitution, and this right
was implicated by the statutory scheme. Id. at 271. With a fundamental interest im
pinged, the court applied Alaska's equal protection analysis. In that analysis, the level
of justification the state must show is in direct proportion to the extent of the infringe
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case, Fisher, which was decided before Saenz. Fisher upheld a Ne
vada cost of living increase to workers' compensation benefits given
only to recipients residing in Nevada. 154 Part lILA also describes
the dissent of that opinion where Judge Hufstedler of the Ninth
Circuit argued that denying a cost of living increase for workers'
compensation to non-residents was indeed a penalty on those who
exercised their right to travel. She asserted that this case could fit
into the Shapiro Equal Protection model. Part III.B discusses
McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., the most recent work
ers' compensation case to rely on right to travel jurisprudence. In
this case, the Connecticut Appellate Court upheld a provision in
the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act that denies additional
partial disability benefits to injured employees no longer willing
and able to work within Connecticut.
A.

Fisher v. Reiser: Allowing Different Compensation For Out
of-State Recipients

1. The Majority Opinion
In Fisher v. Reiser, Nevada's cost-of-living increases in work
ers' compensation benefits were challenged as unconstitutional be
cause they were given only to those injured employees and their
survivors who continued to reside in Nevada. 155 The state's work
ers' compensation program covered employees who were working
ment on the right. Id. at 273-74. In this application, the court found that the statute
"impose[d] a substantial penalty upon the exercise by [workers' compensation recipi
ents] of the right to travel out of Alaska" because the reduction in benefits far exceeded
any change in cost-of-living a recipient might encounter by moving to another state. Id.
at 273. Thus, the state's burden of justification was high, and the court held this was not
met. Id. at 274. If the state was indeed trying to ensure that workers moving out of
state to convalesce did not obtain a windfall and therefore have an incentive to remain
out of work, this objective could have easily been met without impinging on the right to
travel by tying benefit amounts to cost-of-living levels in the recipient's new state of
residence. Id. at 274.
154. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 637:
155. Id. at 631. While this case was decided before Saenz, the outcome likely
would have been the same. Using the Saenz analysis, the court probably would have
chosen the Privileges and Immunities analysis since there was no indication Fisher was
physically stopped from moving to another state. See supra notes 144-50 and accompa
nying text. Fisher's situation was most like that in the third component of the right to
travel; however, because new residents of Nevada were not being treated differently
than old residents, the court most likely would have decided that the third component
of the right to travel was not implicated in the statute. Following that conclusion, the
court would have used the rational basis review, the lowest form of scrutiny, just as it
did, and would have come to the same result.
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in Nevada for a covered employer at the time of their injury.156
Workers who were permanently and totally disabled could receive
two-thirds of their "average wage" at the time of their injury, until
their death, and death benefits were available to the surviving
spouse until their death or remarriage. 157 In 1973 and 1975, the
Nevada legislature recognized the steep inflation rate was severely
impacting recipients and enacted cost-of-living increases totaling
twenty percent. However, only those recipients who remained re
sidents of Nevada could receive the increases. l58
The facts of this case focus on Gladys Fisher. Her husband was
injured while working in a Las Vegas metal shop in 1962, and he
began receiving total disability payments. 159 The couple moved to
California in 1963 so their children could assist in the care of Mr.
Fisher, and when he died in 1972, Mrs. Fisher remained in Califor
nia. 160 Mrs. Fisher requested the cost-of-living increase when en
acted in 1973, and she was told that, unless she moved back to
Nevada, she would continue to receive only $167.50 per month 
the same amount she and her husband had been receiving since
1962.161
The Ninth Circuit held that the right to travel was not penal
ized, and therefore strict scrutiny review of the statute was not war
ranted. 162 The court found three fatal distinctions between this case
and the three right to travel cases cited by Fisher for support. 163
First, the majority contrasted the state's obligation to immediately
grant new residents the same benefits enjoyed by long-time re
sidents with the continuing obligation of a state to a former resi
dent. 164 The court found no support for the proposition that a
former state of residence must include former residents in programs
established to assist current residents. 165 Indeed, the court held
156. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 631. Employees working temporarily outside of the state
were also covered provided they had been hired or regularly employed in Nevada, and
employees hired outside of Nevada were covered as long as they were not working in
Nevada only temporarily and thus covered by another state's program. Id. (citing NEV.
REV. STAT. § 616.520, 616.260 (1979)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 631-32.
159. Id. at 632.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 633.
162. Id.
163. Those cases were Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974),
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
164. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 633-34.
165. Id. at 634.
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that only the state in which a person currently resides has the means
and the obligation to provide for the well being of a resident. 166
Second, the court stated that the right to travel would only be
implicated where there was a "durational aspect" in the statute. 167
States have an unfettered right to offer certain benefits only to their
citizens, and the Supreme Court had, at this point, only struck down
requirements that a new resident live in the state for a specified
time. 168 The court noted that it upheld "bare residency require
ments," such as residency as a condition for municipal
employment. 169
Third, the majority stated that an important factor in right to
travel cases is whether the benefit being denied is of a "fundamen
tal character," like non-emergency medical care, the right to vote,
and subsistence welfare benefits.170 It decided that since Fisher's
benefits were only "supplemental payment[s] for spousal disabil
ity," not based on "financial need," the court would not elevate
them to the same "urgency" as welfare or medical care. l71
Since the right to travel was not implicated, the court applied
the equal protection rationality test. l72 The cost-of-living increases
were paid out of Nevada's general treasury instead of the workers'
compensation insurance fund, and, therefore, the court found that
Nevada could legitimately "confin[e] payments to those most likely
to spend [them] within ... the state."173 The classification of re
sidents versus non-residents was rationally related to this end be
cause the legislature could use many factors to support this
conclusion, such as the cost to administer the program to out-of
state residents and a better understanding of the needs of in-state
residents as opposed to out-of-state residents. 174
166. Id. at 633.
167. Id. at 635.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Servo Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976».
170. Id. The benefits noted are from Mem'l Hosp. V. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974), Dunn V. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Shapiro V. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), respectively.
171. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 636. The court cited Mathews V. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
340-43 (1976), for the holding that benefits not based on financial need will not bring
into question the same constitutional issues that withholding basic subsistence benefits
will.
172. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 636. Where two classes similarly situated are treated dif
ferently, but no fundamental right is implicated, the court will uphold the statute in
question so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate end. CHEMERINSKY, supra note
97, at 764.
173. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 637.
174. Id. The court did not say if there was any evidence that the legislature actu
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The Dissent

Judge Hufstedler began her dissent by stating that workers'
compensation benefits are not the same as welfare and should not
be treated as such when considering constitutional issues surround
ing eligibility requirements. 175 Throughout her opinion, she reiter
ated that the very nature of workers' compensation is to
compensate a worker for past injury, not simply to provide for the
general welfare of a person in need. 176
Judge Hufstedler took on the three flaws that the majority ad
dressed. While she agreed that a person's current state of residence
is in the best and most appropriate position to provide for his or her
general welfare, she said that this situation was "emphatically not
the case before this court."177 In the case of workers' compensa
tion, historically, the state in which the resident worked when in
jured had the responsibility of making such a provision, as it relates
to the injury occurring within the state. 178 Therefore, the person's
"present connection" with a particular state is not important when
considering eligibility; the "past connection" of being injured while
working in the state triggers benefits. Because of this, Judge Huf
stedler argued, a requirement that the recipient also have a "pre
sent connection" restricts the right to travel by forcing the injured
worker to stay in the state to receive his or her full
compensation. 179
Judge Hufstedler also refuted the majority's characterization of
this issue as one not involving a durational aspect.1 80 She again re
ferred to the two connections the Nevada statute required: a "past
connection" (working or residing in Nevada at the time of injury in
order to become initially eligible) and a "present connection" (cur
rent residency in Nevada to receive the cost-of-living increase).181
She pointed out that this was no different than the requirement in
ally used these factors to support its decision to pass this statute. However, the possible
reasons the court put forth do not have to be the actual reasons for the legislation; all
that is required in the lowest level of scrutiny is that the court can conceive a rational
justification. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 764.
175. Fisher, 610 F.2d at 637 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
176. "Disability and death benefit pensions are designed to compensate injured
workers and their survivors for their loss of earning power caused by industrial inju
ries." Id. at 641.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 640.
181. Id. at 641.
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Shapiro that a welfare recipient have been a resident of California
at two distinct points in time: at the time of application and twelve
months prior. 182
Finally, Judge Hufstedler asserted that the cost-of-living in
creases were most certainly of a "fundamental nature," and the de
nial of them resulted in a "significant penalty ... on the exercise of
the right to travel."183 The Fishers relied upon the workers' com
pensation payments in obtaining the basics of day-to-day living, and
the denial of the cost-of-living expenses in the face of steep infla
tion would clearly cause severe hardship.l84
Since Judge Hufstedler firmly believed that the denial of the
cost-of-living increase was indeed a penalty on the exercise of the
right to travel - no different than in Shapiro, Maricopa, and Dunn
- she urged that the court strike down the statute unless it was
proved "necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter
est."185 Judge Hufstedler quickly concluded that Nevada's stated
interest - to make life better for some of its citizens for as little cost
as possible - was hardly compelling, and therefore the statute
should fail. 186
B.

McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp.1 87

Carol McEnerney was injured on the job in 1994, and she re
ceived partial disability benefits until their expiration on January
31, 1997.188 She then became eligible for forty-six weeks of addi
tional benefits pursuant to Connecticut's General Statutes § 31
308a189 and began receiving $271.05 per week.1 90 McEnerney relo
182. Id. at 640.
183. Id. at 642.
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969».
186. Id.
187. McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002).
188. Id. at 819.
189. This statute states in pertinent part:
(a) In addition to the compensation benefits provided by section 31-308 for
specific loss of a member or use of the function of a member of the body, or
any personal injury covered by this chapter, the commissioner, after such pay
ments provided by said section 31-308 have been paid for the period set forth
in said section, may award additional compensation benefits for such partial
permanent disability equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between
the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the
position held by such injured employee prior to his injury, [less applicable
taxes and insurance], and the weekly amount which such employee will proba
bly be able to earn thereafter, [less applicable taxes and insurance]. ... The
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cated to Florida so she could live with her son in a better climate,
and Connecticut terminated the additional payments, even though
she was eligible to collect payments for 15.72 more weeks.1 91 She
appealed to the commissioner and the workers' compensation
board, but both found that she was ineligible for continued pay
ments because she was no longer "willing and able to perform
work" in Connecticut, as required by the statute. 192
In its evaluation of McEnerney's constitutional argument,193
the court first questioned whether the statute imposed a penalty on
those workers' compensation recipients who leave Connecticut to
reside in another state. 194 After acknowledging the long history of
the right to travel, the court cited the three components of the right
enumerated in Saenz .195 Then, without explanation, it settled on a
definition of the right to travel that limits application to "how a
citizen is treated in her new state of residence."196
The court then asserted that the Supreme Court had already
decided this issue in Califano v. Torres .197 In Torres, a Connecticut
resident was denied his Supplemental Security Income benefits af
ter he moved to Puerto Rico. 198 The Court held that the right to
travel doctrine did not "require[ ] that a person who travels to Pu
erto Rico must be given benefits superior to those enjoyed by other
residents of Puerto Rico if the newcomer enjoyed those benefits in
the State from which he came."199 Further, the doctrine would not
"require a State to continue to pay those benefits indefinitely to any
persons who had once resided there. "200 The Connecticut court
duration of such additional compensation shall be determined upon a similar
basis by the commissioner, but in no event shall the duration of such addi
tional compensation exceed the lesser of (1) the duration of the employee's
permanent partial disability benefits, or (2) five hundred twenty weeks. Addi
tional benefits provided under this section shall be available only to employees
who are willing and able to perform work in this state.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-308a (2003).
190. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 819.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. McEnerney's complaint also argued that the statute was not applied cor
rectly, prompting the court to first interpret "willing and able to perform work in this
state." Id. at 820-21. The court found that, based on the language of the statute, the
commissioner was justified in terminating the benefits. Id.
194. Id. at 822.
195. See supra text accompanying note 142.
196. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822.
197. Id. (citing Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978».
198. Torres, 435 U.S. at 2-3.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.

2005]

YOU CAN'T TAKE IT WITH YOU

291

construed the Torres decision as holding that the right to travel
never entitled a benefit recipient to continue receiving those bene
fits from the former state of residence. 201 Since McEnerney's case
represented exactly that situation, the court held that her right to
travel was not implicated, and therefore, Connecticut did not need
to demonstrate a compelling state interest. 202
McEnerney exemplifies rigid application of the Saenz compo
nents. 203 In this case, a clear penalty on the right to travel did not
fit into one of those components. In the next section, this Note will
argue that the application of the right to travel doctrine to workers'
compensation, as seen in Fisher and McEnerney, is flawed. It will
further argue that the three components in Saenz unnecessarilyex
clude protections for citizens leaving former states of residence.
Part IV goes on to suggest an alternate approach to issues involving
the right to travel.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Issue Not Decided by Califano v. Torres

McEnerney relied heavily on Torres for its proposition that for
mer states of residence can never be required to continue to pro
vide benefits for residents who have moved,204 but Torres did not
decide the exact issue presented.
Torres can be distinguished on several different levels. First,
Torres involved a benefit recipient who left the United States in
stead of moving to another state. 205 The Court clearly stated that
the right to international travel was not fundamental, but instead
was "no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment," which could be burdened
to an extent. 206 The right to interstate travel has been designated as
fundamental and can be traced to an early recognition that travel
among the United States was necessary to encourage growth and
trade within the country and to allow citizens of all states to take
part in the centralized government, no matter where it was
located. 207
201. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822.
202. [d. at 823. The court did not discuss the rational basis test because neither
party included that analysis in its brief. [d. at 823 n.9.
203. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
204. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822-23.
205. Torres, 435 U.S. at 2.
206. [d. at 4 n.6.
207. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,43-44 (1867).
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Second, the benefit at issue in Torres was Supplemental Secur
ity Income ("SSI"), a federal program benefit that was not available
to persons residing outside of the United States. 20B Unlike workers'
compensation, SSI required need and specific residency as initial
prerequisites. 209 To permit Torres to take her United States SSI
benefits with her to Puerto Rico would allow her to reap a benefit
unavailable to other residents of Puerto Rico. The Court hinted in
dicta that the same proposition would apply to the states. 210
Indeed, this makes sense for programs like welfare and special
education. 211 Allowing a former resident of one state - California,
for example - to continue to receive welfare benefits from that
state after moving to another state - like Wyoming - would give
that person an advantage over other residents of Wyoming. While
long-time residents of Wyoming would only have the benefit of Wy
oming's welfare program, the new resident could decide which pro
gram would be most beneficial to him.
Also, in this example, California would not have an interest in
funding the livelihood of a resident of Wyoming, and it is far more
appropriate for a person's home state to evaluate the needs of that
person. 212 This argument, that the former state has no interest in
the citizen after he leaves and has no obligation to determine the
citizen's need, is made in Fisher.213 While this argument is clearly
applicable to welfare and similar social assistance benefits, the fol
lowing discussion will show why it cannot apply to workers'
compensation.
The Supreme Court in Torres left the door open for cases
where it might be appropriate to allow someone to take his benefits
with him when he moves to another state. 214 Workers' compensa
tion should be one of those cases because initial eligibility is not
based on residence; it is based on injury.215 So, continuing with the
example above, if a worker is injured in California and moves to
Wyoming, he would not be getting any special advantages over
other residents of Wyoming because the means of comparison
208.
209.
210.

Torres, 435 U.S. at 2.
Id. See supra Part I.B.2.
Torres, 435 U.S. at 4.
211. Cf Michael C. v. Radnor Township Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 2000).
212. See Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1979).
213. Id. at 633.
214. Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 ("If there ever could be a case where a person who has
moved from one State to another might be entitled to invoke the law of the State from
which he came as a corollary of his constitutional right to travel, this is surely not it. ").
215. See supra Part I.D.
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would necessarily be different. The real question would be whether
he was getting benefits superior to other people injured while work
ing in California, since eligibility is not based on where one lives,
but instead on where one is injured. 216 Conversely, taking away
that worker's benefits solely because he left California would put all
those who were injured in California and stayed there in a much
better position, and only because they did not elect to exercise their
right of travel. Such a result is a classic example of a state action
that would be found unconstitutional under Equal Protection.
Additionally, the level of benefits provided through workers'
compensation is not based on the individual's need; it is based on
arbitrary amounts and time limits established by statute. 217 Since
there is no need for any state - the former state or the current state
of residence - to determine the needs of the recipient, the argument
that the current state of residence is in a better position to make
that determination falls short of proving anything.
Third, Torres dealt with a program funded by public federal
funds. In the case of workers' compensation, it is not the state itself
providing the benefits; instead it is the employer, either directly or
through its insurer. In the absence of insurers - and in many states,
large employers may qualify to be self-insured - the employers di
rectly pay for medical expenses and the allowable benefits. Once
again, the argument that it is more appropriate for a state to care
for its own fails because the state is not providing the funding for
the benefits. Employers pay into workers' compensation funds or
to their insurers based on the risk that one of their employees will
be injured, regardless of where those employees reside. 218
B.

"Three Components" Aren't Enough

The recent right to travel jurisprudence does not give enough
weight to the "first component" of travel that ensures free move
ment among the states. Indeed, the Saenz Court did a disservice to
the right to travel by splitting it into three components. 219 This at
tempt at a bright line division has led to some confusion220 and to a
216. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.D.
219. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). See also supra note 142 and accom
panying text.
220. See Wolff, supra note 145, at 330 ("However, Saenz did not unify [the right
to travel] cases under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Quite to the contrary, the
Court solidified the fractionalized right to travel by articulating the three components
which make it up ....").
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gap - an important part of the right to travel is left unprotected by
the three components.
A situation could arise, as in McEnerney, where a citizen of
one state wants to relocate permanently to another state, and is pe
nalized, not by the new state, but by the former state. 221 Yet, this
situation would not be considered a "right to travel" issue under
Saenz because it does not fit neatly into the three components. 222
While this situation should fit into the first component of the right
to travel - the right to move between the states - the Saenz Court
concluded that a state does not infringe on the first component un
less it imposes a physical or administrative obstacle to interstate
border crossings. 223 This narrow interpretation appears to permit
"moving fees" and other non-physical impediments imposed on citi
zens wanting to leave a state - the very exactions that first impli
cated the right to travel.224 Such a view is contrary to the whole
history of the right to travel. Crandall v. Nevada invalidated inter
state travel fees, a historical equivalent to taxing or denying bene
fits to a citizen today who has decided to move to another state.225
The view that imposing fees or denying benefits is not an obstacle
to interstate movement226 does not consider economic realities.
People on the economic edge depend on every dollar they have; a
monetary penalty for exercising a right may prevent an indigent
person from exercising that right.227
Penalties for leaving a state could presumably fit into the third
component - the right to be treated the same as other residents 
but the Saenz Court chose to limit that component only to dispa
22l. See Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930
(1980) (former state denying cost-of-living increases to recipients who have moved out
of state); Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984) (former
state significantly decreasing amount of benefits for those recipients who move to an
other state); McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002), cert. denied, 811 A.2d 1292 (Conn. 2002) (former state withholding benefits after
recipient moves to another state).
222. McEnerney, 805 A.2d at 822.
223. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-0l.
224. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-49 (1867) (holding as unconstitu
tional a fee levied on all passengers leaving Nevada).
225. Id. at 36.
226. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501 ("Given that [restricting the amount of welfare bene
fits a new resident may receive] imposed no obstacle to ... entry into California, we
think ... that the statute does not directly impair the exercise of the right to interstate
movement. ").
227. Recall that actual deterrence is not necessary for a finding that the right to
travel was infringed; the mere possibility that someone would be deterred is enough.
See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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rate treatment by the new state. 228 This component ignores the
possibility that a former state could penalize its citizens for moving
away, effectively trapping them inside the state. 229 The early cases
outlawing fees for traveling to other states were not limited to fees
imposed by the state entered;230 Crandall invalidated fees charged
when a citizen left the state of Nevada. 231 Whenever someone relo
cates, two states are involved, and both are equally capable of pe
nalizing the moving citizen for exercising that right. 232 Regardless
of which state imposes the penalty, a United States citizen is still
penalized for exercising his or her right to move from one state to
another. Whether the former state of residence imposes the pen
alty on the way out or the new state of residence imposes one on
the way in, the citizen still must pay for exercising his or her right.
Coming or going, relocation is relocation. 233
The Saenz components are simply not broad enough to cover
every type of burden on the right to travel. The Courts that articu
lated this right did not intend for it to be so narrowly construed;
they envisioned free unimpeded travel to and from states and relo
cation at will. 234 A penalty placed on citizens solely because they
move to another state clearly obstructs that freedom.235 If the first
component is limited only to actual movement across state lines,
and the other two components only deal with how people are
228. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (defining the third component as "the right of the
newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of
the same State").
229. E.g., McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816, 818-19
(Conn. App. Ct. 2002), cert. denied, 811 A.2d 1292 (Conn. 2002).
230. E.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849).
231. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 36 (1867).
232. "[I]nterstate travel is not a one-way road." Fisher V. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629, 640
(9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
233. The right at issue in the modern cases ... is not simply a right to travel to
or through a state but rather a right to move there - the right ... to relocate
.... To a large extent America was founded by persons escaping from envi
ronments they found oppressive .... [A] dissenting member [of a community]
... should have the option of exiting and relocating in a community whose
values he or she finds more compatible.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 178
79 (1980).
234. See Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49 ("We are all citizens of the United
States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.") (quoting
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849». See also United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
235. E.g., Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43-50 (fee charged to leave the state of
Nevada was an unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel).
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treated by their host or new home state, what protects people from
penalties imposed by the state they are trying to leave?
While the Saenz components are convenient for identifying va
rious Constitutional doctrines that might protect the right,236 the
right should be viewed as more simple and broad, with the constitu
tional basis varying according to the context. 237 The situation in
which the right is implicated, not the right itself, should determine
what constitutional source provides the test to be used. Therefore,
in a situation where visitors are being treated differently than re
sidents, the Privileges and Immunities test should be used. Like
wise, in situations where new residents are treated differently than
long-time residents, an Equal Protection analysis would be
appropriate. 238
Applying an Equal Protection analysis to the McEnerney situa
tion, the court could have looked at whether a classification was
used that implicated the right to travel, instead of declining to im
plicate the right to travel because a new state was not penalizing a
new resident. 239 A classification that hinged on the exercise of the
right to travel was clearly used - of the people injured while work
ing in Connecticut and eligible for supplemental benefits, the class
of recipients who moved and were no longer able to work in Con
necticut were treated differently than those who did not move. 240
Since the exercise of a fundamental right, the right to travel, was
the basis for the classification, "its constitutionality [should have
been] judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a com
pelling state interest. "241 This does not mean that the statute using
the classification would be automatically unconstitutional; it simply
means that the statute should have to pass a more rigorous test.
C. A New Approach for Workers' Compensation Cases

Since the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of restrict
ing workers' compensation benefits based on residency, and be
236. One scholar has questioned the necessity to establish a Constitutional
source. See Turner, supra note 106 (asserting that a firm grounding in the Constitution
gives legitimacy to the right to travel and arguing that the right has more than one
source).
237. Id.
238. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blum
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.~. 618 (1969).
239. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
240. McEnerney v. United States Surgical Corp., 805 A.2d 816, 818-19 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002).
241. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
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cause it does not fit neatly into other prior decisions, a new
approach must be considered. This approach should take into con
sideration the unique characteristics of workers' compensation.
First, courts must not view workers' compensation strictly as wel
fare. In so doing, the Supreme Court must reconsider the scope of
the Saenz components. Indeed, they were developed in a case con
sidering welfare benefits - assistance granted by the state only to
those in dire need. The components do not appear to contemplate
benefits regulated by the state and paid for by private employers in
return for a shield from liability.242 In the case of workers' compen
sation, states are doing much more than providing for the needs of
injured employees. The states are also protecting the interests of
employers in the state by providing a more predictable and inex
pensive means for compensating those employees who are injured
on the job. 243
The more appropriate approach for workers' compensation
statutes that treat non-residents differently than residents is a re
turn to the Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa analysis. 244 If a workers'
compensation statute is based on a classification that penalizes the
beneficiary's right to travel and to choose the state in which he or
she resides, then the classification should be subject to strict scru
tiny. Thus, unless the classification is necessary to achieve a com
pelling state interest, it must fail.
The fairness and flexibility of such an analysis can be seen by
applying it to the two workers' compensation/right to travel cases
discussed in this Note. 245 First, the Nevada program in Fisher
would most likely be upheld, but not for the reasons stated in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion. Rather than attempt to exclude workers'
242. See supra Part I.C.
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See supra notes 136-37.
245. An application of this approach to the Alaska case, decided under the
Alaska Constitution and discussed supra note 153, is also illustrative. The Alaska stat
ute, as written at the time of the Alaska Pacific Assurance case, would not, and did not
survive the Equal Protection analysis used. However, the Alaska legislature modified
the statute to still treat non-residents differently, but in a way that is less discriminatory
than its predecessor. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175(b). The compelling state interest that
Alaska promoted with this statute was encouraging workers to seek recovery from their
injuries and return to employment. The concern was that if injured employees could
take their Alaska benefits to other states with much lower costs-of-living, they would
have no incentive to return to work. Instead of an arbitrary decrease in benefits, the
new program decreases benefits only to the extent that the actual cost of living in the
recipient's new state of residence is less than that of Alaska. As such, the decrease does
not represent a penalty, since the injured employee will presumably have the same
purchasing power, regardless of where he resides.
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compensation from the right to travel doctrine because it is differ
ent than welfare and other state provided services, the court could
have simply applied the Equal Protection analysis to reach the same
result. Because the Nevada state treasury was the source of the
cost of living increases, Nevada had a compelling interest in provid
ing additional support for its own citizens. A state should not be
compelled to use its treasury to care for citizens of other states.
Application of the Shapiro Equal Protection analysis to
McEnerney, however, would yield a different result. The additional
benefits denied to out-of-state residents were not paid by Connecti
cut's state treasury - they were additional payments the employer
had to provide. The state cannot claim an interest in caring for its
own when it is not the entity providing the care. Additionally, if the
stated reason for the provision is to lower costs of workers' com
pensation insurance for employers, denying certain benefits to non
residents is not the necessary, most non-discriminatory way to ac
complish that goal. Reducing some benefits across the board would
produce the same result, as would devising a more stringent review
process to reduce fraud.
CONCLUSION

In short, an analysis that does not take into consideration the
broad purposes of this country's workers' compensation system
does a disservice to workers and creates a class of people - victims
of industrial accidents - who are restricted in their exercise of a
fundamental right. The fundamental right to travel freely among
the states is firmly imbedded in this country's history and jurispru
dence. Hence, McEnerney's interpretation of the current doctrine,
which allows states to penalize workers' compensation recipients
for moving to another state, is at odds both with the history of the
right to travel and the purposes of the workers' compensation sys
tem in the United States .. Using strict scrutiny review to evaluate
workers' compensation provisions that treat injured employees who
move to other states differently will protect the employees' right to
relocate while permitting states to craft statutes that are fair to both
employers and employees.
Michelle L. Himes

